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The Informativeness of U.S. Banks’ Statements of Cash Flows 
 
ABSTRACT 
Banks, financial statement users, and accounting standard setters have long disagreed on 
the informativeness of banks’ statements of cash flows (SCFs) and there is a lack of 
relevant evidence in the literature. This paper examines the informativeness of the SCFs of 
U.S. commercial banks in two settings where SCFs are purported to be useful. The first 
analysis tests the incremental value relevance of banks’ SCFs beyond income statements 
and balance sheets and compares bank’s SCFs with those of industrial firms. We find that 
banks’ SCFs have limited incremental value relevance, and are much less value relevant 
than industrial firms’ SCFs. The second analysis examines and finds no distress-predictive 
power of banks’ SCFs, especially in the presence of standard distress predictors. Overall, 
our results are consistent with the view that banks’ SCFs have limited informativeness. 
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1. Introduction 
Since SFAS 95 took effect in 1988, U.S. GAAP has required U.S. banks, like 
industrial firms, to provide a statement of cash flows (SCF) that categorizes cash flows as 
relating to operating, investing or financing activities. International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) have included a similar requirement for banks and other firms under 
their jurisdiction from 1994.1 However, banks have always argued that, unlike the SCFs 
of industrial firms, theirs provide little additional information because cash flow is not a 
useful measure of operating performance or financial condition for banks.2 Moreover, 
they argue that distinctions between operating, investing and financing activities are not as 
meaningful for banks as for industrial firms. Nonetheless, accounting standard setters 
continue to require banks to provide SCFs. The long-standing debate regarding the 
informativeness of banks’ SCFs and the lack of empirical evidence on this matter motivate 
the current study.  
We empirically investigate the informativeness of banks’ SCFs in two settings where 
SCFs are purported to be useful. First, we examine the value relevance of banks’ SCFs, 
incremental to their income statements and balance sheets. To do so, we first follow prior 
literature (e.g., Barth, Beaver, Hand and Landsman, 1999) and decompose net income into 
operating accruals and cash flow from operations (CFO). This decomposition only 
                                                 
1  Under both U.S. GAAP and IFRS, firms may choose to report cash flows from operations directly (the 
“direct method”) or to adjust accounting income to cash flows from operations (the “indirect method”). 
The vast majority of firms, including banks, in the U.S. and most other countries (an exception being 
Australia) use the indirect method. 
2  This argument appears, for example, in responses to a joint FASB/IASB Discussion paper on Financial 
Statement Presentation (FASB, 2008; IASB, 2008). Also, EFRAG (2015) provides a good summary of 
banks’ objections. 
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considers the operating section of the SCF and could be incomplete for banks, due to the 
concern regarding the arbitrariness of categorizing banks’ operating, investing and 
financing items. Therefore, we develop formulas that relate net income to all three 
sections of the SCF, which can be viewed as generalizing the decomposition of net 
income. To examine the claim that SCFs are useful for industrial firms but not for banks, 
we compare banks’ SCF items with those of industrial firms in terms of incremental value 
relevance. Based on a sample of U.S. banks from 2004 to 2016, we find that, in stark 
contrast to their counterparts in industrial firms’ SCFs, there is little evidence that 
aggregate items (i.e., subtotals) in banks’ SCFs are incrementally value relevant in the 
presence of net income and book value of equity. This is also true of individual items in 
banks’ SCFs. There is some indication that banks’ SCFs are marginally value relevant 
during the 2008 financial crisis. We also find evidence that, in contrast to industrial firms, 
the distinction between operating and non-operating (investing and financing) elements of 
SCFs is uninformative for the valuation of banks. 
Second, we examine the distress prediction power of banks’ SCFs during the 2008 
financial crisis and its immediate aftermath. This analysis is partly motivated by our 
finding that banks’ SCFs are marginally value relevant during the crisis period, and also 
by the standard setters’ view that SCFs may be used to assess banks’ long-term survival 
prospects (FASB 1987, para. 59). We find no evidence that SCF items are useful to 
predict bank distress in the presence of standard predictors, including size, tier-1 capital 
ratio, nonperforming loans, leverage, etc. Hence, consistent with the preceding value-
3 
relevance results, the distress prediction results indicate limited informativeness of banks’ 
SCFs. 
This paper makes several contributions. First, it fills a gap in the literature concerning 
the informativeness of banks’ SCFs. The findings suggest that banks’ SCFs are not 
informative in the primary applications where they are purported to be useful. Second, the 
evidence in this paper is relevant to the ongoing debate on the presentation of bank SCFs, 
which concerns banks, financial statement users and standard setters alike. While the 
results here do not suggest that banks should be exempted from publishing SCFs, one 
policy implication may that banks could be allowed to publish SCFs in a tailored format, 
so that they could use reporting resources more productively. As a broader implication in 
the context of standard setters’ consideration of a financial reporting model that would 
distinguish operating, investing and financing activities in the income statement and the 
balance sheet in a similar way to the SCF, it may be of limited use to require banks to 
present their income statement and balance sheet in such a way. Third, the paper develops 
new formulas that relate net income to all three sections of the SCF, which generalizes the 
decomposition of net income and may be useful to those interested in using SCF 
information to value banks and other firms.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes accounting-
standard-setting activity in relation to banks’ SCFs and reviews relevant literature. Section 
3 describes the research design for our value-relevance tests, Section 4 describes the 
sample and the data for our value-relevance tests, and Section 5 reports the results of these 
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tests. Section 6 describes and reports tests of the distress-predictive power of banks’ SCFs. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Background and prior literature 
2.1. Standard setting activities of banks’ SCFs  
Since the requirement to publish SCFs was first proposed in the 1980s, banks and their 
representatives have argued that SCFs are not as meaningful for banks as for industrial 
firms (FASB, 1987, para. 58−65; comment letters on a joint FASB/IASB 2008 discussion 
paper).3 One common argument is that cash flow is not particularly useful for analyzing a 
bank’s performance and prospects, especially compared to cash flow of industrial firms. 
Another argument is that the distinctions that are made in SCFs between operating, 
investing, and financing cash flows are not as clear-cut for banks as for industrial firms. 
Related to this, differences between banks’ net income and CFO are largely caused by 
changes in financial assets (liabilities), which are “cash-like”. In contrast, the differences 
between industrial firms’ net income and CFO are largely related to depreciation, changes 
in working capital and other operating items that are clearly different from cash. Despite 
the strong reservations by banks and associated bodies, standard setters are not convinced 
and continue to require that banks publish SCFs in much the same way as industrial 
firms.4 
                                                 
3  The comment letters elicited by FASB (2008) and IASB (2008) are available at 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/CommentLetter_C/CommentLetterPage&cid=1218220137090&project_id
=1630-100. 
4  For example, FASB (1987) argues that ‘[w]hile a bank is unique in the sense that cash can be viewed as 
its product, a bank needs cash for essentially the same reasons a manufacturer does - to invest in its 
5 
The SCF in general and banks’ SCF in particular have been considered in ongoing 
projects by the FASB and the IASB, and will likely continue to be considered in the 
future.5 While the standard setters show little appetite for exempting banks from 
providing an SCF, they accept that needs for the SCF are different for financial from those 
for nonfinancial firms.6 Moreover, they appear to be open to suggestions that may 
improve the usefulness of banks’ SCFs, which range from radical changes, such as the 
replacement of the SCF by a statement of changes in highly liquid assets or by a flow 
statement for regulatory capital, to incremental changes, such as the removal of the 
categorization of activities (EFRAG, 2015). The results in our paper can form part of the 
evidence pool that assists the standard setters in their deliberations. More broadly, 
accounting standard setters are considering moves towards a reporting model where, 
similar to the SCF, the income statement and the balance sheet would distinguish between 
operating, financing and investing activities.7 One implication of this study’s results is 
that, for banks, distinguishing these activities in the other two primary financial statements 
may also be of limited usefulness. 
                                                 
operations, to pay its obligations, and to provide returns to its investors.’ (FASB, 1987, para. 59). The 
IASB makes a similar argument (IASB, 2016, para. 3). 
5 In 2004, the FASB and IASB started a joint project to improve the presentation of financial statements, 
including the SCF. This joint project has since been succeeded from 2014 by a FASB project on financial 
performance reporting and by a broader-scoped IASB project on primary financial statements. Also, in 
2017 the FASB initiated a research project on targeted improvements to the statement of cash flows.   
6  See FASB codification topic 230 and topic 942 and the illustrative examples in IAS 7 (IASB, 2016).  
7  See, for example, FASB (2016), as well as papers for the IASB meeting on its primary financial 
statements project held in December 2018. 
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2.2. Prior literature 
This paper draws on two streams of accounting literature: the value relevance of SCFs 
and the prediction of financial distress using SCF items. In the first stream of literature, 
numerous previous studies have examined the value relevance of the SCFs of industrial 
firms and found that valuation multiples on (operating) accruals are lower than those on 
CFO (e.g., Livnat and Zarowin, 1990; Dechow, 1994; Akbar, Shah and Stark, 2011). 
There is limited research, however, on the value relevance of banks’ SCFs. Barth et al. 
(1999) examine the value relevance of accruals and CFO by sectors. They show that the 
valuation multiples on CFO and on accruals are less different from each other in the 
financial-institutions sector than in other industrial sectors. For a small sample of large 
U.S. banks with significant trading activities, Ryan, Tucker and Zarowin (2006) analyze 
the association between stock returns and cash and accrual components of net income, 
which are obtained from SCFs. They find that returns are more highly associated with 
components relating to operating activities than with components relating to non-operating 
(trading) activities.  
More closely related to ours, a study by Burke and Wieland (2017; henceforth BW) 
finds that CFO and accruals of US banks are both value relevant. Our paper differs from 
BW in several key aspects. First, the main focus of our value-relevance analysis is on the 
incremental value relevance of bank SCFs, especially beyond income statements. Second, 
our paper considers the information in an entire SCF, whereas BW only focuses on the 
information in an SCF’s operating section. Third, our paper compares banks’ SCFs with 
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those of industrial firms’, which BW does not do. Lastly, our paper also examines the 
distress predictive ability of banks’ SCFs, which BW does not do either. 
The second stream of relevant literature concerns the prediction of financial distress 
using financial statement items, especially involving cash flows and banks. Cash flows 
have been shown to have distress-predictive power for companies in general (Jones and 
Hensher, 2004) and industrial firms in particular (Schellenger and Cross, 1994). Using 
pre-SFAS-95 data, previous research has also found that self-constructed cash flows (i.e., 
not directly from the SCF) have predictive power for financial institutions’ distress (e.g., 
Henebry, 1996; Catanach, 2000). Our paper differs from these studies by examining the 
distress-predictive power of SCF items, which are more precise measures of cash flow and 
related items. 
 
3. Research design for value-relevance tests 
3.1. SCF items and their relations with net income 
Our empirical analyses center on extracting information from banks’ SCFs. One of the 
primary contributions of an SCF (in the indirect form) is allowing users to decompose net 
income into a cash component (CFO) and an accrual component (operating accruals), 
which have distinctive implications for stock markets (Sloan, 1996). This relation can be 
written as follows: 
        NI ≡ CFO + OPA,       (I-C.0) 
8 
where NI is net income, CFO is operating cash flow, and OPA is operating accruals.8 
While widely used (e.g., Barth et al. 1999; Hribar and Collins 2002), the relation (I-
C.0) only utilizes an SCF’s operating section and ignores the investing and financing 
sections, which could potentially contain useful information. Moreover, because the 
distinctions between banks’ operating, investing, and financing items are not clear-cut 
(Ryan, 2007), focusing exclusively on the operating section risks discarding an arbitrarily 
determined subset of the information in an SCF. Instead, we seek to include all three 
sections of an SCF, which allows us to obtain evidence on the usefulness of an SCF as a 
whole, as well as the usefulness of labelling items as operating versus non-operating. To 
do so, we note that an SCF first adjusts net income for operating accruals (under the 
indirect method) and then reports cash flows from investing and financing activities, and 
thereby arrives at the change in cash and cash equivalents as the bottom line. This process 
relates net income to these SCF items, which effectively generalizes the decomposition of 
net income (I-C.0). Specifically: 
         NI ≡ C + OIF,          (I-C.1) 
where ∆C is the change in cash and cash equivalents, excluding cash flows with 
shareholders (henceforth “non-shareholder change in cash”).9 OIF reconciles net income 
with non-shareholder change in cash and contains operating accruals, investing items 
(from the investing section) and non-shareholder financing items (i.e., cash flows with 
                                                 
8  OPA in (I-C.0) can also be calculated as the sum of all adjustments in the operating section of the SCF 
(under the indirect method) times −1. The sign reversal ensures that OPA and CFO add up to NI. For 
example, a credit sale is an increase in operating accruals, but it is a negative adjustment in the SCF. 
9  Cash flows with shareholders include equity issues, dividend payouts and share repurchases.  
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debtholders from the financing section).10 Let IF be all non-operating items (i.e., the sum 
of investing and non-shareholder financing items), OIF ≡ OPA + IF. This gives: 
        NI ≡ C + OPA + IF.           (I-C.2) 
We choose not to decompose non-operating items IF because banks’ investing items are 
almost indistinguishable from non-shareholder financing items (Ryan et al., 2006).11  
The income-cash relations (I-C.0), (I-C.1) and (I-C.2) apply to both banks and 
industrial firms in the value-relevance analysis in Section 5. They are also used in the 
distress-prediction analysis in Section 6 (applied to banks only).  
Finally, we consider the possibility that, although aggregate SCF items might not be 
meaningful for banks, individual items in banks’ SCFs might still be useful (Ryan, 2007). 
This leads to the following income-cash relation:  
NI ≡ C + LOAN_HFS + LLP + SEC_GL + TRAD_OTH + OTHER_O 
 + LOAN_HFI + SINV + DEPOSIT + DEBT + OTHER_IF,   (I-C.3) 
where LOAN_HFS = change in loans held-for-sale; LLP = loan-loss provision; SEC_GL = 
investment security gains and losses; TRAD_OTH = net change in trading and other assets 
and liabilities; OTHER_O = other operating accruals; LOAN_HFI = change in loans held 
for investment; SINV = change in investments; DEPOSIT = decrease (increase) in 
deposits; DEBT = decrease (increase) in current and long-term debt; OTHER_IF = other 
                                                 
10 Investing and non-shareholder financing items are equal to the corresponding cash flows times −1. We 
reverse the signs of these cash flows so that all operators in (I-C.1) and (I-C.2) are plus. Because 
investing and non-shareholder financing items correspond to long-term operating assets (e.g. PPE) and 
financing items (e.g., debt), they can be thought of as generalized “accruals”, just as a change in working 
capital corresponds to operating accruals. For example, the acquisition of PPE, a cash outflow (negative) 
in the SCF, increases long-term operating assets, which will be recorded as an expense in the future, just 
as a prepaid expense is.   
11 In our sample, the correlation between banks’ investing and non-shareholder financing items is about 
−0.9.  
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investing and financing items.12 Consistent with the preceding income-cash relations, all 
right-hand-side items (except C) are equal to the respective SCF item times −1. 
3.2. Value-relevance regression models 
Our first empirical analysis examines the incremental value relevance of bank SCF 
items beyond net income. Value-relevance analysis has long been used to evaluate the 
informativeness of accounting information for valuation purposes (e.g., Aboody and Lev, 
1998; Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 1998; Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Collins, Maydew 
and Weiss, 1997; Collins, Pincus and Xie, 1999; Francis and Schipper, 1999). The basis 
for value-relevance analysis is the equity valuation model of Ohlson (1995), stated here in 
the form of a regression:  
        MV = v0 + v1NI + v2BV,         (1) 
where MV is market value of equity, NI is net income, and BV is book value of equity. The 
coefficients v and v can be interpreted as valuation multiples for relevant items.  
To examine whether the operating section of the SCF is incrementally value relevant, 
we modify regression 1 using the decomposition (I-C.0):  
      MV = 0 + 1OPA + 2NI + 3BV.          (2) 
The coefficient for OPA (1) captures the incremental valuation multiple for operating 
accruals over CFO and the coefficient for NI (2) captures the valuation multiple for CFO, 
which is the one component of net income that is omitted from the regression.13 In other 
                                                 
12 All individual items add up to OIF. Moreover:  
    OPA = LOAN_HFS + LLP + SEC_GL + TRAD_OTH + OTHER_O 
    IF = LOAN_HFI + SINV + DEPOSIT + DEBT + OTHER_IF. 
13 To see this, substitute NI in regression 2 with CFO + OPA to obtain:  
       MV = 0 + (1+2)OPA + 2CFO + 3BV.  
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words, a significant 1 indicates that the valuation multiples on CFO and OPA are 
different from each other. Because CFO and OPA are only available in the operating 
section of an SCF, this serves as evidence that the SCF is incrementally informative for 
valuation purposes, beyond income statements and balance sheets. Previous research 
documents that industrial firms’ operating accruals have a lower valuation multiple than 
their CFO (Sloan, 1996; Barth et al., 1999), so to the extent that banks behave like 
industrial firms, 1 is expected to be negative.  
 To examine whether an entire SCF is incrementally useful for valuation purposes, we 
use the income-cash relation (I-C.1) to modify regression 1: 
      MV = 0 + 1OIF + 2NI + 3BV,          (3) 
where OIF sums all SCF items between net income and non-shareholder change in cash 
(C). We are interested in the coefficient for OIF (1), which captures the incremental 
valuation multiple for OIF over C.14 A significant 1 suggests that the two elements of 
SCF—C and OIF—have different valuation coefficients and therefore should be treated 
differently. In turn, it implies that the SCF is useful in providing users with the 
information about such elements. 
 To examine whether distinguishing operating and non-operating items is informative, 
we use the income-cash relation (I-C.2) to modify regression 1: 
                                                 
Moreover, in a regression of MV on OPA and CFO, significant coefficients on OPA and CFO are not 
evidence that the SCF is incrementally value relevant; such an implication can only be drawn from the 
inequality of the two coefficients.  
14 Using (I-C.1), we substitute NI in regression (3) with ΔC + OIF, leading to a regression equivalent to (3):  
       MV = 0 + (1+2)OIF + 2ΔC + 3BV.  
It is evident that the valuation multiple of OIF is 1+2;, and that of ΔC is 2; so 1 is the incremental 
valuation multiple for OIF over ΔC. 
12 
      MV = 0 + 1OPA + 2IF + 3NI + 4BV.        (4) 
The coefficients for OPA and IF (1 and 2) are the incremental valuation multiples for 
operating accruals and non-operating items, respectively, over C; the coefficient for NI 
(3) is the valuation multiple for C. Here, we can test whether the valuation multiples for 
OPA and IF are equal to each other. 
Finally, to examine the informativeness of individual items in banks’ SCFs, we use (I-
C.3) to modify regression 1: 
MV = c0 + c1LOAN_HFS + c2LLP + c3SEC_GL + c4TRAD_OTH + c5OTHER_O +  
c6LOAN_HFI + c7SINV + c8DEPOSIT + c9DEBT + c10OTHER_IF + c11NI + c12BV. (5) 
As before, the coefficient for an individual item is the incremental valuation multiple on 
the item over C, and its significance indicates the incremental value relevance of the 
item. Because the first five items (LOAN_HFS, LLP, SEC_GL, TRAD_OTH, OTHER_O) 
add up to OPA, we expect their coefficients to be negative, by referencing the expected 
sign of the OPA coefficient in regression 2. The other items are non-operating, about 
which we do not have directional predictions. 
In regressions 2–5, MV is measured at the end of the fourth month after the end of 
fiscal year t so that it reflects information in year t’s annual financial statements.15 NI is 
income before extraordinary items in year t, and BV is common equity at the end of year t. 
                                                 
15 This is done by multiplying the market value at the fiscal year end by the return on the firm's shares 
between the fiscal year end and the end of the fourth month after that year end. This procedure adjusts for 
any capital issues or distributions that may have occurred during that interval.   
13 
All variables are scaled by lagged total assets.16,17 Because the valuation multiple on net 
income (book value) is likely to be lower (higher) for loss firms than for profitable firms 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997), we include an indicator for loss and let it interact with all 
the independent variables:  
MV = 0 + 1OPA + 2NI + 3BV + 
4LOSS + 5OPA×LOSS + 6NI×LOSS + 7BV×LOSS,    (2′) 
where LOSS is equal to one if a firm-year reports a loss and zero otherwise. Our main 
focus of interest is still the coefficient for OPA (1), which now reflects the incremental 
valuation multiple for operating accruals over CFO for profit firm-years. The coefficient 
1+5 is the counterpart for loss firm-years.18 In light of prior evidence (e.g., Burgstahler 
and Dichev 1997), 1 (5) is expected to be negative (positive), 2 (6) is expected to be 
positive (negative), and 3 and 7 are expected to be positive.  
We estimate regressions 2–4 separately for banks and industrial firms, and test for the 
equality of coefficients between the two types of entities.19 Regression 5 is only estimated 
                                                 
16 Scaling by total assets causes intercept terms to differ between banks and industrial firms because, on 
average, banks have much higher leverage than industrial firms and, consequently, much lower total-
asset-scaled accounting numbers. Scaling intercept terms would eliminate this effect. Our reported results 
are based on regression models with unscaled intercepts. As reported subsequently, a robustness test 
showed that our inferences are not sensitive to whether or not intercept terms are scaled. 
17 Barth and Kallapur (1996) recommend dealing with scale issues in regression models by including a scale 
proxy as an independent variable. Untabulated tests show that our inferences are robust to the alternative 
method recommended by those authors. 
18 Estimating regression 2′ for the whole sample is equivalent to estimating regression 2 for the profit 
sample and loss sample separately.  
19 To test the equality of coefficients between banks and industrial firms, we estimate models (2), (3) and (4) 
for a combined sample of banks and industrial firms, including a binary variable to indicate entity type 
(and let the entity-type indicator interact with all independent variables, including loss-related ones). The 
significance of the interaction term between a firm-type indicator and an independent variable indicates 
whether the coefficient for that variable is significantly different between the two types of entity. 
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for banks because items are bank-specific. All regressions include year fixed effects and t-
statistics are based on White standard errors that are clustered by firm. 
 
4. Sample, data and descriptive statistics for value-relevance analyses 
The accounting data for banks are from Compustat Bank and those for industrial firms 
from Compustat; stock return data are from CRSP. Compustat Bank only provides SCF 
data for banks from 2004, which limits the starting point of the sample. The initial sample 
includes all U.S. publicly listed commercial banks (SIC code 602) and industrial firms (in 
other SIC codes) from 2004 to 2016. The sample firms satisfy the following selection 
criteria: (i) required data are available; (ii) share price of more than $1; and (iii) positive 
book value of equity. The final sample consists of 4,450 bank-years (594 different banks) 
and 33,849 industrial-firm-years (5,217 different industrial firms). The Appendix details 
the construction of the variables. To mitigate the impact of outliers, the most extreme 2% 
of all (scaled) variables are winsorized.20 
Table 1 reports the sample composition for value-relevance analyses. Panel A 
summarizes the numbers of firm-year observations by year for banks and industrial firms, 
as well as by profit and loss. The percentages of losses in banks increase very substantially 
from 1.5% in 2006 to 7.9% in 2007, triple to above 25% for 2008–2010, and then fall 
                                                 
20 To maintain the relations between accounting variables as prescribed by (I-C.0)−(I-C.3), we keep one 
variable unwinsorized, but calculate it using one of the income-cash-relations. For example, we winsorize 
NI and CFO by the most extreme 2% and then calculate OPA using (I-C.0). Regarding the individual 
items used in model (5), we winsorize each item belonging to OPA (IF) except for OTHER_O 
(OTHER_IF); OTHER_O (OTHER_IF) is then calculated as winsorized OPA (IF) minus the sum of the 
winsorized items. In robustness tests, we use other winsorization methods: winsorizing the most extreme 
2% of cases year-by-year; winsorizing the top and bottom 1% both for pooled data and year-by-year. 
Inferences are robust to these alternative winsorization methods. 
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substantially to about 12% in 2011 and about 2% in 2016. While the Bank for 
International Settlements (2010, page 10) sees the financial crisis as lasting from 2007 to 
2009, the panel shows the continuing high proportions of bank losses in 2010. Thus, we 
treat 2007 to 2010 as the crisis sub-period in our value-relevance analysis. Panel B 
summarizes the numbers of industrial firms and firm-year observations by SIC Code.  
In Table 2, Panel A reports descriptive statistics for (unwinsorized) firm characteristics 
for banks and industrial firms: market capitalization (at fiscal year end), book value of 
equity, total assets, and leverage. As expected, the mean and median leverages of banks 
are much higher than the corresponding statistics for industrial firms. Panel B reports 
descriptive statistics for the regression variables used in regressions 2–4, and Panel C 
reports the correlations between these variables. Panel C reveals some striking contrasts 
between banks and industrial firms. For example, the Spearman correlation coefficient 
between OPA and CFO is −0.775 for banks, but only −0.034 for industrial firms. The high 
negative OPA-CFO correlation for banks is consistent with many of banks’ operating 
accruals being financial in nature and relatively indistinguishable from CFO; instead CFO 
and operating accruals largely substitute for each other. This high negative correlation for 
banks contrasts with the much lower negative correlation for industrial firms whose 
operating accruals are predominantly non-financial in nature and distinctive from cash. 
The implication is that the SCF is likely to be less informative for banks than for industrial 
firms. Another noticeable difference between banks and industrial firms is the correlation 
between non-shareholder change in cash (C) and non-operating items (IF): it is −0.921 
16 
for banks, but only −0.619 for industrial firms. Panel D reports descriptive statistics for the 
bank-specific regression variables in regression 5.  
 
5. Incremental value relevance of banks’ SCFs: Empirical results 
Table 3 reports the results of value-relevance tests for banks and industrial firms, in 
which we regress market value on SCF items in the presence of net income and book 
value.21 Panel A reports the results from estimating regressions 2–4 over the overall 
sample period of 2004–2016. Here and in subsequent tables, our discussion focuses on 
profit firms, which are the majority of the sample; the inferences for loss firms are similar. 
In regression 2, our interest lies in the coefficient for OPA, which, if significant, indicates 
that, for profitable firms, the valuation multiple for operating accruals differs from that for 
CFO. In the “Banks” column, the coefficient for OPA is negative and marginally 
significant (−0.160, p < 0.05), indicating that, for profitable banks, the valuation multiples 
for operating accruals and CFO are only marginally different from each other, which 
renders SCF weakly informative. In contrast, in the “Industrial” column, the OPA 
coefficient is much larger in magnitude and highly significant (−3.992, p < 0.01), 
suggesting that, for profitable industrial firms, the valuation multiple for operating 
accruals is significantly lower than that for CFO. The “Diff (p)” column confirms that the 
OPA coefficient for banks is significantly smaller than that for industrial firms (p < 0.01). 
The implication of these findings is that the operating section of SCF is substantially less 
                                                 
21 As we seek to present strong and robust evidence of statistical significance, the text primarily focuses on 
results that are significant at least at 5%. 
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informative for banks than for industrial firms. These findings echo the differential OPA-
CFO correlations between the two types of entities (Panel C, Table 2) and could be rooted 
in the claimed difference between the operations of banks and industrial firms.  
 Regressions 3 and 4 in Panel A are motivated by the suggestion that the distinction 
between banks’ operating and non-operating items, as currently presented, is arbitrary. 
Unlike regression 2, the cash-flow construct in regression 3 is non-shareholder change in 
cash (C), and OIF, which combines operating accruals with non-operating items, 
replaces OPA. The inferences from regression 3 also point to the lack of informativeness 
of banks’ SCFs. For example, the OIF coefficient is insignificant for profitable banks 
(−0.041, p > 0.1), but strongly significant for profitable industrial firms (−0.688, 
p < 0.01). Unsurprisingly, the OIF coefficients are significantly different between the two 
types of entities (p < 0.01). 
In regression 4, where OIF is decomposed into OPA and IF, the OPA coefficient for 
profitable banks is marginally significant (−0.192, p < 0.05), similar to its counterpart in 
regression 2. Nonetheless, banks’ OPA coefficient is still significantly smaller in 
magnitude than industrial firms’ (p < 0.01), thus corroborating the key inference from the 
preceding two regressions. Moreover, the IF coefficients for banks and industrial firms are 
both insignificant (−0.037 and 0.008, respectively; p > 0.1 for both), and they are not 
significantly different from each other (p = 0.821). Additional tests on the equality of the 
OPA and IF coefficients (reported in the bottom-right of Panel A) show that the 
coefficients for OPA and IF are weakly distinguishable from each other for profitable 
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banks (p = 0.054), but they are significantly different for profitable industrial firms 
(p < 0.01). This is yet further evidence that the distinction between operating and non-
operating elements of banks’ SCFs is uninformative. 
 Panels B–D in Table 3 report the results from estimating regressions 2–4 separately 
for the three sub-periods: the pre-crisis period (2004–2006), the crisis period (2007–2010), 
and the post-crisis period (2011–2016). Interestingly, for banks, the coefficients for 
variables of interest—OPA, OIF and IF—are marginally significant only in the crisis 
period, but not in the pre- and post-crisis periods. Specifically, Panel C shows that, for 
profitable banks during the crisis period, the OPA coefficient is marginally significant in 
regression 2 (−0.226, p < 0.1), the OIF coefficient is significant in regression 3 (−0.103, p 
< 0.05), and the OPA and IF coefficients are both significant (p < 0.05) in regression 4. 
The inference is that banks’ SCFs could be more useful for investors in a highly uncertain 
and challenging environment, presumably by assisting investors to assess banks’ chances 
of survival. Despite these limited improvements during the financial crisis, banks’ SCFs 
are still far less value relevant than industrial firms’, and that is true in all sub-periods. 
 To summarize, the results in Table 3 suggest that, as far as aggregate SCF items are 
concerned, banks’ SCFs provide little useful information for valuation, especially in the 
presence of income statements and balance sheets, which is in stark contrast to industrial 
firms’ SCFs. Nevertheless, there is some indication that banks’ SCFs are more value 
relevant during the financial crisis.22 
                                                 
22 Our results are qualitatively comparable to those in Burke and Wieland (2017), which show positive and 
significant coefficients for CFO. However, unlike Burke and Wieland (2017), we do not find that 
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Table 4 reports the results from estimating regression 5, which examines the 
incremental value relevance of individual items in banks’ SCFs over the whole period and 
the three sub-periods. For profitable banks, only the coefficients for SEC_GL (gains and 
losses from investment securities), OTHER_O (other operating accruals), and DEPOSIT 
(changes in deposits) are statistically significant over the whole period, indicating that the 
valuation multiples for these items differ from that for C. These items (except 
OTHER_O), however, are not consistently significant in all sub-periods. Therefore, the 
main inference from the individual-item results are consistent with those from the 
aggregate-item results in Table 3: banks’ SCFs are uninformative for valuation purposes. 
We implement a number of robustness tests. First, we construct alternative samples: 
negative book-value cases are included; and cases of mergers and acquisitions (during the 
financial crisis) are excluded. Second, we also implemented a returns specification similar 
to the one in Ryan et al. (2006).23 Our inferences are robust from these alternative 
specifications. 
Overall, the value-relevance analyses find that banks’ SCFs have limited incremental 
informativeness for the purpose of valuation, and they are much less informative than 
industrial firms’ SCFs. Interestingly, banks’ SCFs are moderately value relevant during 
                                                 
coefficients for CFO are significantly higher than those for operating accruals. One possible cause of this 
discrepancy is model specification: while Burke and Wieland (2017) control for lagged book value, we 
use contemporaneous book value, as in Barth et al. (1998).  
23 The dependent variable is annual stock return lagged by 4 months, and the explanatory variables are the 
same as those in Tables 3 and 4, except for scaling by lagged market value of equity. Unlike in a levels 
specification, there is no role for book value within a returns specification. 
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the financial crisis, which partially motivates the subsequent analysis of the predictive 
ability of bank SCFs for distress in the financial crisis and the aftermath. 
 
6. Predictive ability for distress of banks’ statements of cash flows 
In this section, we examine the distress-predictive power of banks’ SCFs during the 
financial crisis of the late 2000s and its immediate aftermath. Our aim is to assess 
parsimoniously the incremental distress-predictive power of items in banks’ SCFs, rather 
than provide a comprehensive model for bank-distress prediction. This examination is 
motivated by several considerations. First, the evidence from the preceding value-
relevance analysis suggests that banks’ SCFs are moderately value relevant during the 
financial crisis (but not in the other periods), suggesting that SCFs could have been useful 
to infer banks’ survival prospects in that challenging business environment. Second, 
standard setters claim distress-predictive power as one of the key benefits provided by 
SCFs. FASB argues that “to survive, a bank—like a manufacturer—must generate positive 
(or at least neutral) cash flows from its operating, investing and financing activities over 
the long run” (FASB, 1987, para. 59). In contrast, banks maintain that the information in 
SCFs is of little help in assessing a bank’s future financial health.24 Interestingly, the FR 
Y-9C regulatory reports that bank holding companies file with the Federal Reserve 
                                                 
24 For an example of this argument, see the comment letter from the European Banking Federation (letter 
61) in response to a discussion paper of the joint FASB/IASB project on financial-statement presentation 




System do not include SCFs, suggesting that bank regulators have a different view from 
standard setters and do not see SCFs as important (for bank supervision).  
6.1. Sample, data, and distress prediction models 
Following Ng and Roychowdhury (2014), we use information available in 2007 to 
predict distresses that occur from 2008 to 2010. Similar to the value-relevance analysis, 
the 2008–2010 period is based on the standard timing of the 2008 financial crisis (e.g., 
Bank for International Settlements, 2010), but it is modified by the fact that, in our data, 
2010 is the year with the most distress cases, a feature probably due to the time lag from 
initial impact to confirmed distress.25  
The sample used in this analysis comprises the 382 banks in 2007 that are used in our 
value-relevance analysis (see Table 1, Panel A and Table 5, Panel A). We define a bank as 
distressed if it or, in the case of a bank-holding company, any of its banking subsidiaries 
entered into receivership under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
between 2008 and 2010.26 We identify 36 distress cases out of the 382 in our sample 
(9.42%), of which 15 and 21 cases entered receivership in 2009 and 2010, respectively. 
We follow the extensive distress prediction literature and employ a logit regression 
model as follows:27 
DISTRESS2008-10 = b0 + ∑ n
 nSCF_ITEMn,2007 + b1NI2007 + b2TARP2007 + 
                                                 
25 Specifically, there are no distress cases in 2007 or 2008, 15 in 2009, 21 in 2010; then, the number of 
distress cases tails off, with 9 in 2011 and 3 in 2012. 
26 Distress cases are available at http://www.fdic.gov. About 97% of the 382 cases are bank holding 
companies. 
27 Another distress-prediction model commonly used in the literature is the Cox proportional hazard model 
(Shumway, 2001; Ng and Roychowdhury, 2014). The unreported results and inferences from that model 
are very similar to those arising from estimating model (6).  
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         b3SIZE2007 + b4TIER12007 + b5NPL2007 + b6LEVERAGE2007,     (6) 
where the dependent variable DISTRESS2008-10 is equal to one if a bank experiences distress 
between 2008 and 2010, and zero otherwise. Our main interest is items in banks’ SCFs 
(SCF_ITEM). The exact variables vary depending on which form of income-cash relation 
is involved. Thus, SCF_ITEM can be (each as a version of regression 6): (i) OPA (I-C.0); 
(ii) OIF (I-C.2); (iii) OPA and IF (I-C.2); and (iv) LOAN_HFS, LLP, SEC_GL, TRAD_OTH, 
OTHER_O, LOAN_HFI, SINV, DEPOSIT, DEBT, OTHER_IF (I-C.3). 
Additional predictors in regression 6 are widely used in prior literature. TARP is an 
indicator variable, which is equal to one if a capital infusion was received under the U.S. 
Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), and zero otherwise.28 TARP capital 
infusions are expected to be negatively associated with future distress, because they were 
more likely to be granted to banks that, despite being poorly capitalized, had a relatively 
sound underlying business (Bayazitova and Shivdasani 2012; Ng and Roychowdhury 
2014). The rest of the predictors are size (SIZE), tier 1 capital ratio (TIER1), non-
performing loans (NPL), and leverage (LEVERAGE). The Appendix details the 
construction of the control variables. All of the predictors except TARP and SIZE are 
multiplied by 100 so that the coefficients are of more readable magnitudes. The most 
extreme 2% of cases for each continuous predictor (except TARP) are winsorized. Panel B 
of Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for the variables in regression 6. 
                                                 
28 TARP operated between October 2008 and December 2009 to help commercial banks weather liquidity 
shocks during the financial crisis. Data on TARP participation were obtained from U.S. Treasury financial 
stability reports (available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/Pages/default.aspx). 
Unlike the other control variables, TARP is not a predictor: it controls for an event during the distress-
prediction period, rather than something that was observable at the end of 2007. 
23 
6.2. Results  
Panel C in Table 5 reports results estimating the logistic regression 6, in which 
columns (6.i)–(6.iii) concern aggregate SCF items and column (6.iv) concerns individual 
SCF items. Regardless of specific income-cash relations, items in bank SCFs show no 
predictive power for future distress, raising a question over the claims for such a benefit.29 
These results are in contrast to those in the literature, although major methodological 
differences exist between those studies and ours: Henebry (1996) and Catanach (2000) 
report evidence for U.S. financial institutions, but use self-constructed cash flow measures 
(i.e., pre-SFAS-95 data); Schellenger and Cross (1994) report for U.S. industrial firms; 
Jones and Hensher (2004) report economy-wide Australian evidence. Among the 
additional predictors, the coefficient for TARP is consistently negative and significant, as 
expected;30 the other predictors also behave reasonably. 
We conduct a number of robustness analyses. First, we repeat the distress prediction 
tests in subsequent years: i.e., we use data from 2008 (2009) to predict bank distress over 
three subsequent years. Second, we control for the influence of off-balance-sheet (OBS) 
items, which, due to their large magnitude and opaque nature, could be a red flag for 
                                                 
29 When we estimate model (6) without additional predictors (unreported), some SCF items are significant. 
For example, OIF in (6.ii) and IF (6.iii) are both significant at 5%; so are LLP (loan-loss provision) and 
LOAN_HFI (change in loans held for investment) in (6.iv). However, because our purpose is to assess the 
incremental predictive power of bank SCFs, beyond other financial statements and other available data, 
those results do not constitute strong evidence for bank SCFs’ usefulness. 
30 Unreported results suggest that, consistent with prior evidence in Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) and 
Ng and Roychowdhury (2014), the banks in our sample that received TARP were those with relatively 
low regulatory capital but relatively strong underlying businesses. We note that the pseudo R2 reported for 
models (6.i)–(6.iii) are similar to those reported for similar models in Ng and Roychowdhury (2014). 
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banks’ financial standing (Haq and Heaney, 2012).31 Third, we examine the distress 
predictive power of bank SCF items in a sample excluding the smallest banks. This 
analysis is motivated by the concerns that small banks have simpler funding models and 
cash-flow patterns and SCF might be less relevant to them than to their larger 
counterparts.32 Fourth, we exclude cases where mergers and acquisitions occurred during 
the crisis. Fifth, we apply the Cox proportional hazard model to our data. Our inferences 
are robust from these alternative approaches.  
To summarize, we find that, controlling for other standard predictors, neither 
aggregate nor individual SCF items predict future bank distress. This lack of usefulness 
for distress prediction by banks’ SCF is consistent with their uninformativeness for 
valuation purposes documented earlier.  
 
7. Conclusion 
There is a long-standing controversy regarding the usefulness of banks’ SCFs. Banks 
have argued that the nature of their business makes their SCFs uninformative, especially 
compared to industrial firms’ SCFs; some even suggest that banks should be exempted 
from publishing SCFs. As exemplified in SFAS 95 (FASB, 1987) and in recent 
pronouncements, accounting standard setters have not been persuaded by these arguments 
                                                 
31 OBS is measured as the sum of off-balance sheet items 44–53 on the FR Y-9C forms filed by bank 
holding companies with the Federal Reserve. For a subperiod from 2004 to 2012, this is included in 
models (6.i.c)–(6.iv.c) as an additional control variable. Because not all banks in our sample file FR Y-
9Cs, either because they are not bank holding companies (approximately 3%) or because they are below 
the size threshold, the requirement for data on OBS reduces the sample slightly. 
32 Distress prediction tests are not performed on the small bank sample because there are only two cases of 
financial distress. 
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and have continued to require banks to provide SCFs. In light of the limited evidence 
available, calls have been made for more research on this issue (e.g., EFRAG, 2015). 
In this paper, we report U.S.-based evidence relevant to the debate on the 
informativeness of banks’ SCFs in two analyses. The first analysis tests the incremental 
value relevance of banks’ SCFs beyond income statements and balance sheets, and 
compares bank’s SCFs with those of industrial firms. The results suggest that U.S. banks’ 
SCFs have limited incremental value relevance, and much less than the SCFs of industrial 
firms. We also find evidence that, in contrast to industrial firms, the distinction between 
operating and non-operating (investing and financing) elements of SCFs is uninformative 
for the valuation of banks. 
The second analysis examines the distress-predictive power of banks’ SCFs. We find 
no distress-predictive power of SCF items in the presence of standard predictors for bank 
distress. Therefore, both analyses indicate that banks’ SCFs, as currently presented, lack 
incremental, consistent and economically identifiable benefits.  
 The results of this study contribute to the pool of evidence that accounting standard 
setters might use in their deliberations over the presentation of SCF. While we would not 
claim that our results justify banks being exempt from publishing SCFs, it might be worth 
exploring the possibility that banks be allowed to publish SCFs in a tailored format, which 
would result in more productive use of reporting resources. Furthermore, the evidence 
presented here regarding the limited benefit from distinguishing banks’ activities may be 
relevant to those interested in using SCF information to value banks. Although this study 
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is based on SCFs prepared under U.S. GAAP, the similarity between the SCF format 
under U.S. GAAP and under IFRS suggests that the results are also relevant to the IFRS 
context, a point acknowledged by EFRAG (2015). More broadly, the results of our paper 
also have implications for standard setters’ consideration of a reporting model in which 
the income statement and the balance sheet might distinguish activities in a manner similar 
to how the SCF currently does. Our results suggest that distinguishing operating, financing 
and investing activities in the other two financial statements may not be as useful for 
banks as for industrial firms. 
It should be acknowledged that our analysis is based on information from SCFs as 
currently constructed, and it is possible that differently constructed SCFs might provide 
greater evidence of informativeness. We also acknowledge that value relevance and 
distress-predictive power are only two criteria by which the usefulness of financial-
statement information can be judged.  
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Panel A: Number of entities by year 
 Sample period Banks (SIC code 602) Industrial firms (other SIC codes) 
(fiscal year) Profit Loss All  Profit Loss All 
2004 404 9 413  2,081 844 2,925 
2005 401 9 410  2,054 802 2,856 
2006 392 6 398  2,049 789 2,838 
2007 352 30 382  1,927 802 2,729 
2008 245 119 364  1,555 863 2,418 
2009 183 143 326  1,481 888 2,369 
2010 224 79 303  1,701 628 2,329 
2011  281  40  321   1,899  688  2,587 
2012  283  27  310   1,795  761  2,556 
2013  291  13  304   1,750  854  2,604 
2014  306  7  313   1,728  928  2,656 
2015  301  6  307   1,544  999  2,543 
2016   294     5   299   1,489    950  2,439 
All  3,957  493  4,450   23,053  10,796  33,849 
Number of entities    594     5,217 
 
 
Panel B: Number of industrial firms and firm-year observations by SIC codes 
SIC Codes Industry Firms Firm-years 
0100-0999 Agriculture, forestry and fishing  20  112 
1000-1499 Mining  291  1,739 
1500-1799 Construction  72  516 
2000-3999 Manufacturing  2,653  17,397 
4000-4999 Transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary service  446  2,598 
5000-5199 Wholesale trade  205  1,301 
5200-5999 Retail trade  396  2,792 
7000-8999 Services  1,262  7,173 
9900-9999 Other   89  221 
 Total  5,434*  33,849 
The initial sample is U.S. publicly-listed entities in Compustat Bank (banks) and Compustat (industrial firms) from 2004 
to 2016. The final sample satisfies the following selection criteria: (i) required data are available; (ii) share price of more 
than $1; and (iii) positive book value of equity. 
* The total number of industrial firms in Panel B differs from that in Panel A because firms may acquire different SIC 






Panel A: Firm characteristics 
($ millions, except 





Banks        
Market capitalization 2,299 14,255 2.099 74.069 214.02 777.28 308,768 
Book value of equity 1,868 13,036 0.683 68.643 150.19 523.92 241,620 
Total assets  19,011 136,347 50.79 798.71 1,729 5,188 2,573,126 
Leverage 0.901 0.031 0.100 0.887 0.903 0.918 0.976 
Industrial firms        
Market capitalization 4,217 17,363 1.110 150.14 575.87 2,210 629,010 
Book value of equity  1,513 6,565 0.044 70.537 248.06 880.87 283,001 
Total assets 4,634 22,754 0.423 129.80 520.00 2,151 797,769 
Leverage 0.465 0.222 0.001 0.289 0.464 0.626 1.026 
 
 
Panel B: Variables for regressions 2-4 
(Scaled by lagged total 





Banks        
MV (also in model 5) 0.145 0.074 0.001 0.093 0.139 0.189 0.337 
BV (also in model 5) 0.104 0.032 0.002 0.084 0.100 0.119 0.214 
NI (also in model 5) 0.007 0.009 -0.035 0.005 0.009 0.012 0.052 
OPA -0.007 0.015 -0.067 -0.010 -0.005 -0.001 0.069 
IF 0.010 0.033 -0.251 -0.003 0.009 0.023 0.208 
OIF 0.003 0.032 -0.279 -0.008 0.004 0.016 0.210 
CFO 0.014 0.013 -0.091 0.010 0.014 0.019 0.091 
C 0.004 0.031 -0.203 -0.008 0.005 0.016 0.273 
Industrial firms        
MV 1.920 2.193 0.003 0.669 1.213 2.237 13.974 
BV 0.602 0.350 0.000 0.374 0.561 0.766 2.390 
NI -0.015 0.228 -1.229 -0.031 0.038 0.084 1.295 
OPA -0.069 0.119 -2.335 -0.107 -0.057 -0.021 2.238 
IF 0.077 0.182 -2.457 0.016 0.063 0.125 2.594 
OIF 0.008 0.189 -2.744 -0.052 0.012 0.068 2.783 
CFO 0.054 0.198 -0.994 0.025 0.086 0.144 1.192 





Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Correlations between variables for regressions 2-4 
 BV NI OPA IF OIF CFO C 
Banks        
MV 0.551*** 0.729*** 0.287*** -0.045*** 0.091*** 0.232*** 0.136***
BV  0.372*** 0.134*** -0.011 0.064*** 0.145*** 0.070***
NI 0.392***  0.367*** -0.025* 0.153*** 0.326*** 0.142***
OPA 0.182*** 0.514***  -0.278*** 0.139*** -0.652*** 0.003 
IF -0.008 0.024 -0.272***  0.851*** 0.289*** -0.878***
OIF 0.075*** 0.261*** 0.182*** 0.897***  -0.001 -0.921***
CFO 0.080*** 0.144*** -0.775*** 0.332*** -0.017  0.091***
C 0.042*** 0.034** -0.031** -0.921*** -0.956*** 0.062***  
Industrial firms        
MV 0.536*** 0.299*** -0.042*** 0.196*** 0.198*** 0.250*** 0.058***
BV  0.197*** 0.042*** 0.202*** 0.266*** 0.117*** -0.046***
NI -0.164***  0.362*** 0.167*** 0.412*** 0.728*** 0.507***
OPA -0.040*** 0.492***  -0.283*** 0.371*** -0.228*** 0.034***
IF 0.318*** -0.022*** -0.269***  0.684*** 0.378*** -0.417***
OIF 0.282*** 0.289*** 0.372*** 0.794***  0.161*** -0.406***
CFO -0.164*** 0.853*** -0.034*** 0.135*** 0.109***  0.539***
C -0.361*** 0.693*** 0.168*** -0.619*** -0.490*** 0.695***  
 
Panel D: Additional variables for bank-only regression 5  
(Scaled by lagged total 





LOAN_HFS 0.000 0.009 -0.049 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.049 
LLP -0.005 0.007 -0.034 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 0.013 
SEC_GL 0.000 0.001 -0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 
TRAD_OTH 0.000 0.005 -0.022 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.022 
OTHER_O -0.002 0.008 -0.074 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 0.064 
LOAN_HFI 0.040 0.065 -0.176 0.000 0.017 0.071 0.265 
SINV 0.006 0.039 -0.140 -0.008 0.000 0.019 0.149 
DEPOSIT -0.046 0.075 -0.290 -0.081 -0.036 -0.002 0.217 
DEBT -0.004 0.038 -0.132 -0.020 0.000 0.012 0.132 
OTHER_IF 0.014 0.048 -0.339 -0.002 0.003 0.021 0.403 
Panel A reports statistics for unwinsorized firm characteristics at the fiscal year end; leverage is total liabilities divided 
by total assets. In Panels B–D, regression variables are scaled by lagged total assets and winsorized by extreme 2%. MV 
is market value of equity at the end of the fourth month after the fiscal year end (= an entity’s market value at the fiscal 
year end times the stock return over subsequent four months); BV is book value of common equity; NI is income before 
extraordinary items; OPA is operating accruals; IF is investing and non-shareholder financing items; OIF = OPA + IF; 
CFO is cash flow from operations; C is non-shareholder change in cash. In Panel C, Pearson (Spearman) correlations 
are above (below) the diagonal. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, 
in two-tailed tests. Panel D reports additional regression variables in Model 5 (equal to the respective SCF items times -
1): LOAN_HFS is change in loans held-for-sale; LLP is loan loss provision; SEC_GL is investment security gains and 
losses; TRAD_OTH is net change in trading and other assets and liabilities; OTHER_O is other operating accruals; 
LOAN_HFI is change in loans held for investment; SINV is change in investments; DEPOSIT is change in deposits; DEBT 
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Value Relevance of Aggregate Items in Statements of Cash Flows: Banks vs. Industrial Firms 
Panel A: The overall sample period (2004-2016) 
      Dependent: MV     
Independent   Model ( 2)    Model (3)   Model ( 4)  
variables Banks Industrial Diff (p) Banks Industrial Diff (p) Banks Industrial Diff (p) 
Intercept 0.026 *** -0.070 0.027 0.027*** 0.139*** 0.072 0.026*** -0.070 0.029 
 (4.83) (-1.31)  (5.06) (2.74)  (4.85) (-1.32)  
OPA (−) -0.160 ** -3.992*** <0.01    -0.192** -3.987*** <0.01 
 (-1.99) (-11.56)     (-2.27) (-11.65)  
OIF    -0.041 -0.688*** <0.01    
    (-1.56) (-3.60)     
IF       -0.037 0.008 0.821 
       (-1.43) (0.04)  
NI (+) 6.056 *** 9.364*** <0.01 5.991*** 8.140*** <0.01 6.068*** 9.362*** <0.01 
 (14.59) (26.18)  (14.59) (21.03)  (14.66) (25.34)  
BV (+) 0.912 *** 2.045*** <0.01 0.913*** 2.180*** <0.01 0.911*** 2.044*** <0.01 
 (23.16) (23.48)  (23.18) (24.52)  (23.10) (23.69)  
LOSS 0.009 -0.484***  0.008 -0.548***  0.009 -0.393***  
 (0.61) (-5.20)  (0.57) (-5.92)  (0.61) (-4.19)  
OPA×LOSS (+) 0.233 3.589*** <0.01    0.276* 4.052*** <0.01 
 (1.44) (8.48)     (1.70) (9.37)  
OIF×LOSS    0.057 1.478*** <0.01    
    (1.38) (6.19)     
IF×LOSS       0.051 0.919*** <0.01 
       (1.25) (3.64)  
NI×LOSS (−) -6.242 *** -13.188*** <0.01 -6.116*** -12.278*** <0.01 -6.270*** -13.337*** <0.01 
 (-13.21) (-33.44)  (-13.83) (-29.43)  (-13.30) (-32.84)  
BV×LOSS (+) 0.050 0.952*** 0.017 0.049 0.630*** 0.535 0.051 0.749*** 0.045 
 (0.79) (8.22)  (0.76) (5.20)  (0.80) (6.30)  
Adjusted R2 0.706 0.513  0.706 0.500  0.706 0.516  
Number of Obs.  4,450    33,849     4,450    33,849     4,450    33,849  
Specifications Year fixed effect; White standard error clustered by firm 
    Equality tests of coefficients in Model 4 (p)   
    Coefficient pair  Banks Industrial  
    OPA vs. IF  0.054 <0.01  







Panel B: The pre-crisis period (2004-2006) 
      Dependent: MV     
Independent   Model ( 2)    Model (3)   Model ( 4)  
variables Banks Industrial Diff (p) Banks Industrial Diff (p) Banks Industrial Diff (p) 
Intercept 0.025 *** -0.461*** < 0.01 0.025*** -0.304*** < 0.01 0.025*** -0.460*** < 0.01 
 (2.79) (-8.06)  (2.80) (-5.32)  (2.75) (-8.01)  
OPA (−) -0.078 -3.231*** < 0.01    -0.024 -3.182*** < 0.01 
 (-0.71) (-10.50)     (-0.20) (-8.89)  
OIF    0.049 -0.489** 0.017    
    (0.90) (-2.23)     
IF       0.047 0.070 0.917 
       (0.86) (0.32)  
NI (+) 7.546 *** 10.523*** < 0.01 7.525*** 10.050*** 0.001 7.536*** 10.504*** < 0.01 
 (12.33) (22.46)  (12.37) (19.65)  (12.32) (21.55)  
BV (+) 0.854 *** 2.021*** < 0.01 0.855*** 2.098*** < 0.01 0.854*** 2.013*** < 0.01 
 (13.09) (20.04)  (13.17) (20.13)  (13.15) (20.13)  
LOSS 0.019 -0.281*** < 0.01 0.022 -0.312*** 0.001 0.035* -0.178* 0.037 
 (0.99) (-2.86)  (1.17) (-3.18)  (1.82) (-1.78)  
OPA×LOSS (+) 0.464 * 3.309*** < 0.01    0.376 3.811*** < 0.01 
 (1.84) (7.00)     (1.51) (7.14)  
OIF×LOSS    -0.272* 1.515*** < 0.01    
    (-1.79) (4.57)     
IF×LOSS       -0.357** 1.054*** < 0.01 
       (-2.46) (3.17)  
NI×LOSS (−) -7.574 *** -14.818*** < 0.01 -7.528*** -14.672*** < 0.01 -7.242*** -15.047*** < 0.01 
 (-7.32) (-27.57)  (-7.40) (-25.57)  (-8.42) (-26.96)  
BV×LOSS (+) 0.361 ** 0.771*** 0.065 0.273* 0.461*** 0.391 0.197 0.537*** 0.118 
 (2.30) (4.91)  (1.90) (2.79)  (1.35) (3.31)  
Adjusted R2 0.580  0.488     0.580  0.476     0.581  0.492  
Number of Obs. 1,221 8,619  1,221 8,619  1,221 8,619  
Specifications Year fixed effect; White standard error clustered by firm 
    Equality tests of coefficients in Model 4 (p)   
    Coefficient pair  Banks Industrial  
    OPA vs. IF  0.512 < 0.01  








Panel C: The crisis period (2007-2010) 
      Dependent: MV     
Independent   Model ( 2)    Model (3)   Model ( 4)  
variables Banks Industrial Diff (p) Banks Industrial Diff (p) Banks Industrial Diff (p) 
Intercept -0.009 -0.260*** < 0.01 -0.007 -0.042 0.531 -0.008 -0.263*** < 0.01 
 (-1.11) (-4.83)  (-0.83) (-0.76)  (-1.00) (-4.91)  
OPA (−) -0.226 * -3.994*** < 0.01    -0.313** -4.069*** < 0.01 
 (-1.70) (-12.34)     (-2.24) (-11.89)  
OIF    -0.103** -0.958*** < 0.01    
    (-2.39) (-4.88)     
IF       -0.098** -0.140 0.834 
       (-2.30) (-0.72)  
NI (+) 6.869 *** 8.523*** 0.037 6.757*** 7.831*** 0.196 6.877*** 8.556*** 0.035 
 (10.13) (20.62)  (9.76) (16.95)  (10.20) (19.99)  
BV (+) 0.721 *** 1.633*** < 0.01 0.727*** 1.717*** < 0.01 0.721*** 1.644*** < 0.01 
 (10.19) (17.90)  (10.24) (18.43)  (10.16) (18.59)  
LOSS -0.007 -0.258*** 0.011 -0.009 -0.367*** < 0.01 -0.008 -0.146 0.160 
 (-0.64) (-2.64)  (-0.82) (-3.78)  (-0.70) (-1.49)  
OPA×LOSS (+) 0.309 4.822*** < 0.01    0.436* 5.781*** < 0.01 
 (1.40) (11.07)     (1.91) (12.19)  
OIF×LOSS    0.142** 2.670*** < 0.01    
    (2.39) (8.66)     
IF×LOSS       0.138** 1.852*** < 0.01 
       (2.32) (5.86)  
NI×LOSS (−) -7.031 *** -12.923*** < 0.01 -6.867*** -12.627*** < 0.01 -7.092*** -13.352*** < 0.01 
 (-9.72) (-25.62)  (-9.65) (-23.26)  (-9.83) (-25.56)  
BV×LOSS (+) 0.212 ** 0.707*** < 0.01 0.198** 0.397*** 0.258 0.208** 0.471*** 0.130 
 (2.24) (4.80)  (2.11) (2.66)  (2.21) (3.21)  
Adjusted R2 0.639 0.448  0.639 0.436  0.640 0.457  
Number of Obs. 1,375 9,845  1,375 9,845  1,375 9,845  
Specifications Year fixed effect; White standard error clustered by firm 
    Equality tests of coefficients in Model 4 (p)   
    Coefficient pair  Banks Industrial  
    OPA vs. IF  0.105 < 0.01  







Panel D: The post-crisis period (2011-2016) 
      Dependent: MV     
Independent   Model ( 2)    Model (3)   Model ( 4)  
variables Banks Industrial Diff (p) Banks Industrial Diff (p) Banks Industrial Diff (p) 
Intercept 0.029 *** -0.191** <0.01 0.030*** 0.054 0.933 0.030*** -0.194** <0.01 
 (4.24) (-2.45)  (4.37) (0.78)  (4.23) (-2.55)  
OPA (−) -0.082 -4.341*** <0.01    -0.093 -4.385*** <0.01 
 (-0.68) (-6.96)     (-0.76) (-7.26)  
OIF    -0.019 -0.762** 0.018    
    (-0.53) (-2.45)     
IF       -0.015 -0.071 0.885 
       (-0.42) (-0.20)  
NI (+) 4.396 *** 9.396*** <0.01 4.349*** 7.471*** <0.01 4.405*** 9.408*** <0.01 
 (7.60) (15.57)  (7.74) (12.13)  (7.65) (15.29)  
BV (+) 1.025 *** 2.244*** <0.01 1.025*** 2.448*** <0.01 1.024*** 2.254*** <0.01 
 (20.02) (15.63)  (19.92) (16.95)  (19.89) (15.76)  
LOSS 0.008 -0.448***  0.01 -0.552***  0.01 -0.375***  
 (0.48) (-3.97)  (0.56) (-5.15)  (0.60) (-3.32)  
OPA×LOSS (+) -0.095 3.514*** <0.01    -0.103 3.888*** <0.01 
 (-0.47) (4.89)     (-0.54) (5.46)  
OIF×LOSS    0.084 1.264*** <0.01    
    (1.15) (3.51)     
IF×LOSS       0.108 0.747* 0.058 
       (1.42) (1.89)  
NI×LOSS (−) -4.568 *** -12.88*** 0.07 -4.61*** -11.265*** 0.548 -4.445*** -12.992*** 0.025 
 (-6.29) (-20.04)  (-6.60) (-17.32)  (-6.24) (-19.84)  
BV×LOSS (+) -0.118 0.95*** 0.78 -0.131 0.629*** 0.443 -0.12 0.788*** 0.772 
 (-1.04) (5.31)  (-1.15) (3.42)  (-1.07) (4.32)  
Adjusted R2 0.619 0.529  0.619 0.516  0.619 0.531  
Number of Obs.  1,854    15,385     1,854    15,385     1,854    15,385  
Specifications Year fixed effect; White standard error clustered by firm 
    Equality tests of coefficients in Model 4 (p)   
    Coefficient pair  Banks Industrial  
    OPA vs. IF  0.523 <0.01  
    OPA×LOSS vs. IF×LOSS  0.282 <0.01  
The table reports the results of estimating regressions (2)-(4). The variables are defined in Table 2. Panels A-D are for the 
overall sample period (2004-2016), and the sub-periods 2004-2006, 2007-2010, and 2011-2016, respectively. The columns 
headed “Banks” and “Industrial” report regression statistics for banks and industrial firms, respectively. t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are based on White standard errors that are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. The columns headed “Diff (p)” report p-values for two-sided 
equality tests of regression coefficients for banks and industrial firms. At the bottom of each panel, the section “Equality tests 
of coefficients in Model 4 (p)” reports p-values from two-tailed tests of equality of coefficient pairs in Model (4): OPA vs. IF, 





Value Relevance of Individual Items in Banks’ Statements of Cash Flows 
 Dependent variable (Model 5): MV 
Independent variables 2004-2016 2004-2006 2007-2010  2011-2016 
Intercept 0.019*** 0.015 -0.009 0.022*** 
Operating items     
LOAN_HFS (−) 0.003 0.219 0.195 -0.019 
LLP (−) 0.383 0.970 -0.308 1.423** 
SEC_GL (−) -2.494*** -4.657 *** -2.956 *** -1.825 
TRAD_OTH (−) 0.210 0.629 ** -0.082 0.054 
OTHER_O (−) -0.973*** -1.173 *** -0.825 *** -0.759** 
Investing and financing items       
LOAN_HFI 0.035 0.155 *** -0.130 ** 0.138*** 
SINV 0.005 0.078 -0.014 -0.007 
DEPOSIT -0.092*** -0.045  -0.068  -0.091** 
DEBT 0.005 0.100 -0.023 0.000 
OTHER_IF 0.038 0.086 0.088 0.059 
NI (+) 6.186*** 7.570 *** 7.266 *** 4.371*** 
BV (+) 0.896*** 0.785 *** 0.735 *** 1.010*** 
LOSS 0.018 0.043 *** -0.007 0.020 
LOAN_HFS×LOSS (+) 0.170 0.398 0.154 -0.334 
LLP×LOSS (+) -0.145 1.193 0.513 -1.046 
SEC_GL× LOSS (+) 2.077* 0.075  2.275 *  6.708* 
TRAD_OTH × LOSS (+)  -0.260 0.541 0.024 -0.122 
OTHER_O× LOSS (+) 0.932*** 0.473  0.829 ** 0.818* 
LOAN_HFI× LOSS 0.013 -0.511 *** 0.176 ** 0.043 
SINV× LOSS 0.070 0.202 * 0.076 0.153 
DEPOSIT× LOSS 0.121*** -0.259 *** 0.114 * 0.169* 
DEBT× LOSS 0.000 -0.214 ** 0.050 0.152 
OTHER_IF× LOSS -0.112* -0.631 *** -0.186 0.009 
NI× LOSS (−) -6.332*** -8.978 *** -7.423 *** -4.893*** 
BV× LOSS (+) 0.042 0.218 * 0.189 * -0.097 
Adjusted R2 0.722 0.627 0.652 0.648 
Number of observations 4,450 1,221 1,375  1,854 
Other specifications Year fixed effect; White standard error clustered by firm 
The table reports the results of estimating the regression model 5. The variables are defined in Table 2. t-statistics are based 
on White standard errors that are clustered by firm and omitted for the brevity. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests.  
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Table 5 
Statements of Cash Flows and Prediction of Bank Distress 




2010   21 
Total distressed banks 36 
Total non-distressed banks  346 
Total banks 382 




Panel B: Descriptive statistics for regression variables for Model 6: Distressed and non-distressed 
banks 
 Distressed banks (N=36) Non-distressed banks (N=346) 
Variables Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St. Dev. Median 
Aggregate SCF items       
OPA -0.432 1.886 -0.322 -0.425 1.249 -0.343 
IF 2.024 3.293 1.527 1.207 2.854 0.931 
OIF 1.592 3.403 1.198 0.782 2.577 0.466 
NI 0.578 1.108 0.589 0.839 0.651 0.919 
Individual SCF items       
LOAN_HFS 0.123 1.212 -0.022 -0.035 0.723 0.000 
LLP -0.656 0.573 -0.460 -0.314 0.421 -0.199 
SEC_GL -0.003 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.082 0.000 
TRAD_OTH 0.196 0.427 0.077 0.123 0.539 0.041 
OTHER_O -0.092 0.808 -0.039 -0.199 0.623 -0.157 
LOAN_HFI 9.003 6.400 8.532 6.423 6.541 5.181 
SINV -0.263 3.383 -0.061 -0.095 3.931 -0.167 
DEPOSIT -3.540 8.521 -4.345 -2.105 6.932 -1.165 
DEBT -3.595 4.204 -3.558 -3.163 4.268 -2.639 
OTHER_IF 0.419 1.348 0.177 0.147 1.876 0.228 
Additional predictors       
TARP 0.056 0.232 0.000 0.546 0.499 1.000 
SIZE 14.285 1.110 14.058 14.489 1.541 14.205 
TIER1 10.176 2.115 9.675 11.121 2.538 10.365 
NPL 1.689 1.226 1.303 0.874 0.845 0.625 




Panel C: Logit model 6 for bank distress prediction 
(N = 382) Dependent variable: DISTRESS2008-10 
Predictors (6.i) (6.ii) (6.iii) (6.iv) 
OPA 0.047  0.114  
 (0.29)  (0.68)  
OIF  0.093   
  (1.30)   
IF   0.092  
   (1.28)  
Operating items     
LOAN_HFS    0.179 
    (0.70) 
LLP    -0.374 
    (-0.76) 
SEC_GL    -3.541 
    (-0.94) 
TRAD_OTH    -0.174 
    (-0.37) 
OTHER_O    0.470 
    (1.10) 
Investing and financing items     
LOAN_HFI    0.146 * 
    (1.81) 
SINV    0.011 
    (0.12) 
DEPOSIT    0.082 
    (1.04) 
DEBT    0.051 
    (0.56) 
OTHER_IF    9.936 
    (0.86) 
NI (−) 0.143 0.076 0.060 0.147 
 (0.52) (0.29) (0.21) (0.39) 
TARP (−) -3.110 *** -3.094 *** -3.094 *** -3.298 *** 
 (-4.12) (-4.10) (-4.10) (-4.26) 
SIZE (−) -0.121 -0.054 -0.054 0.036 
 (-0.77) (-0.33) (-0.33) (0.21) 
TIER1 (−) -0.321 *** -0.303 ** -0.302 ** -0.240 * 
 (-2.75) (-2.54) (-2.53) (-1.92) 
NPL (+) 0.341 ** 0.318 ** 0.317 ** 0.335 * 
 (2.39) (2.22) (2.21) (1.83) 
LEVERAGE (+) -0.056 -0.020 -0.023 0.014 
 (-0.56) (-0.20) (-0.22) (0.12) 
Pseudo R2 0.249 0.256 0.256 0.298 
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The sample includes 382 banks that were in existence at the end of 2007. Panel A reports the number of distressed banks in 
each of 2008, 2009 and 2010. Panel B reports descriptive statistics of regression variables in Model 6. TARP is an indicator 
variable that equals one if a capital infusion under TARP over 2008-2009 was received and zero otherwise; SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets denominated in thousands of dollars; TIER1 is tier-1 capital ratio; NPL is non-performing loans 
divided by total assets; LEVERAGE is total liabilities divided by total assets; the rest variables are defined in Table 2. All 
continuous variables (i.e., except TARP) are measured at the end of 2007 and winsorized by 2% at both tails. All of these 
variables except TARP and SIZE are multiplied by 100 when used in the estimation. Panel C reports the results of estimating 
the logit model 6, where the dependent variable DISTRESS2008-10 is equal to one if a bank is distressed during the 2008-2010 
period, and zero otherwise. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
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APPENDIX: STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS: COMPUSTAT DATA ITEMS AND CONSTRUCTION OF REGRESSION VARIABLES 
Part 1:  Statement-of-Cash-Flow Items from Compustat Bank Used to Construct the Variables in This Study.  
 Compustat Data Item 
Operating:       Income before extraordinary items (cash flow) IBC 
                Extraordinary items and discontinued operations (cash flow) XIDOC 
                Depreciation and amortization (cash flow) DPC 
                Deferred taxes (cash flow) TXDC 
                Provision for loan losses PCLC 
                Equity in net loss - earnings ESUBC 
                Investment security gains/losses INVSGL 
                Other gains/losses on sales OGLOS 
                Mortgages – decrease (increase) INVCH 
                Accounts payable and accrued liabilities – increase (decrease) APALCH 
                Accounts receivable – decrease (increase) RECCH 
                Income taxes – accrued – increase (decrease) TXACH 
                Excess tax benefit stock options – cash flow operating TXBCO 
                Assets and liabilities – other – net change AOLOCH 
                Other operations OTHOP 
           Operating activities – net cash flow OANCF 
Investing:         Short-term investments – change IVSTCH 
                 Increase in investments (excluding loans) -IINVC 
                 Decrease in investments (excluding loans) DINVC 
                 Increase in loans receivable -ILREC 
                 Decrease in loans receivable DLREC 
                 Capital expenditures -CAPX 
                 Sale of property SPPE 
                 Acquisitions -AQC 
                 Investing activities – other IVACO 
           Investing activities – net cash flow IVNCF 
Financing:        Deposits – net change DEPCH 
                 Purchase of common and preferred stock -PRSTKC 
                 Sale of common and preferred stock  SSTK 
                 Cash dividends (cash flow) -DV 
                 Long-term debt – issuance DLTIS 
                 Long-term debt – reduction -DLTR 
                 Current debt – changes DLCCH 
                 Excess tax benefit of stock options-cash flow financing TXBCOF 
                 Financing activities – other OFA 
           Financing activities – net cash flow FINCF 
Exchange rate effect EXRE 
Cash and cash equivalents – increase (decrease) CHECH 
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APPENDIX: STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS: COMPUSTAT DATA ITEMS AND CONSTRUCTION OF REGRESSION VARIABLES - CONTINUED 
  Part 2: Construction of Statement-of-Cash-Flow (SCF) Variables from Compustat Bank Items.  
Variables (all scaled by lagged total assets) Regression models Compustat data items (see Part 1 of the Appendix) or, 
in italic font, variables from which the item is 
constructed  
Name Notation 
Income before extraordinary items (NI) NI (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) IBC 
Operating accruals OPA (2), (4), (6) IBC - OANCF + EXRE (× -1) 
where EXRE (× -1) is treated as an operating accrual 
and EXRE is effectively treated as part of cash flow 
from operations (CFO). 
The element of OIF made up of SCF items 
categorized as 'investing' or 'financing' 
IF (4). (6) IVNCF (× -1) 
+ (FINCF -SSTK+ PRSTKC + DV) (× -1) 
where financing items are stated exclusive of 
shareholder cash flows by subtracting issues of stock 
(SSTK) and adding back purchases of stock 
(PRSTKC) and dividends (DV). 
The excess of NI over nonshareholder change in 
cash 
OIF (= OPA + IF)  (3), (6) IBC - (CHECH-SSTK+PRSTKC+DV) 
 
Components of OPA:    
Increase (decrease) in loans held-for-sale LOAN_HFS (5), (6) INVCH (× -1) 
Loan-loss provision LLP (5), (6) PCLC (× -1) 
Investment security gains and losses SEC_GL (5), (6) INVSGL(× -1) 
Net increase (decrease) in trading and other 
assets and liabilities 
TRAD_OTH (5), (6) AOLOCH (× -1) 
Other operating accruals OTHER_O  
 
(5), (6) Equal to OPA less the sum of LOAN_HFS, LLP, 
SEC_GL and TRAD_OTH 
Components of OIF:    
Increase (decrease) in loans held for investment LOAN_HFI (5), (6) (DLREC - ILREC) (× -1) 
Increase (decrease) in investments SINV (5), (6) (IVSTCH - IINVC + DINVC) (× -1) 
Decrease (increase) in deposits DEPOSIT (5), (6) DEPCH (× -1) 
Decrease (increase) in current and long-term debt DEBT (5), (6) (DLTIS - DLTR + DLCCH) (× -1) 
Other investing and financing items OTHER_IF  (5), (6) Equal to IF less the sum of LOAN_HFI, SINV, 
DEPOSIT and DEBT 
Cash flow items referred to in model 
development but not used in regression models: 
   
Cash flow from operations CFO None Equal to NI less OPA 
Equal to OANCF plus EXRE 
Nonshareholder change in cash C None Equal to NI less OIF 






APPENDIX: STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS: COMPUSTAT DATA ITEMS AND CONSTRUCTION OF REGRESSION VARIABLES - CONTINUED 
  Part 2 (Continued): Construction of Statement-of-Cash-Flow (SCF) Variables from Compustat Bank Items 
 
Notes to Part 2: 
1. Data items available from Compustat Bank are used to construct regression variables for banks for use in regression models (2) to (6). The subset of items that are 
required for industrial firms for models (2) to (4) are also available in Compustat. Some data items for models (5) and (6), which are estimated for banks only, are 
not available for industrial firms. 
2. All items referred to above (except NI) are defined such that they are added to the relevant cash-flow construct to give NI. For example, cash flow from operations 




APPENDIX: STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS: COMPUSTAT DATA ITEMS AND CONSTRUCTION OF REGRESSION VARIABLES - CONTINUED 
Part 3: Construction of Variables Other Than Statement-of-Cash-Flow (SCF) variables. 
Variable name Label Calculation 
Market value of equity (scaled by total assets) MV (P×SHROUT)×the return on the share up to 4 months after the fiscal year end (from 
CRSP) 
Book value of equity (scaled by total assets) BV CEQ (from Compustat Bank, and from Compustat for industrial firms) 
Total assets (used to scale other variables) SIZE (Note ) AT (from Compustat Bank, and from Compustat for industrial firms) 
Indicator variable for loss firms LOSS Equals 1 if the firm reported a loss and 0 otherwise 
Indicator variable for TARP recipients TARP Equals 1 if a capital infusion under TARP was received and 0 otherwise 
Tier 1 capital ratio TIER1 CAPR1 (from Compustat Bank) 
Non-performing loans (scaled by total assets) NPL NPAT (from Compustat Bank) 
Leverage LEVERAGE LT/AT (from Compustat Bank) 
 
Note to Part 3: 
When used as a regression variable, SIZE is measured as the log of total assets. 
 
